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DISCUSSION OUTLINES
A. Defining District Wealth.
-The Hudson plan for Nebraska.
-Continue the current property wealth definition.
-Count income and sales in local effort and district wealth.
-Full state funding for school aid.
B. Addressing Declining Enrollmentss Phantom Pupils
-S7 states use some form of phantom pupils.
C. Addressing Size Ecoribmiess'Classroom units.
D. Restructuring Incentives.
-Voluntary- restructuring incentives. .
^Mandatory restructuring.
^^Mahdatory study and vote;
-Open enrollment and tuition grants.
-Innovation grants for telecommunications.
E. Spending Limitations.
—Budget limits.- ' .
-Property tax rate limits.
-Limits on expenditures per pupil'; '
* This review of literature was requested by the Interim School
Finance Study Committee of the Iowa Legislature. It was
presented to the' Study Committee in testimony at the ' State
Capitoly Des Moines, Iowa, June 54, 1988.
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University. James J. Knudsen is a Graduate Research Assistant
who assisted Dr. Edelman. Dr. Edelman was.'requested to serve, as
a consultant to the Iowa Department of Education and the Interim
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,> -r . A REVIEW OF STATE PROGRAMS:
ADJUSTMENT OPTIONS FDR DECLINING ENROLLMENTS
. 'o. 3. AND ECONOMIES OF SIZE
Companion reports JEdelman^and Knudsen)^ review the effects
of .declining . enrollments ; and economies of size on per pupil
expenditures and various state aid formulas. This report reviews
the alternative ways- that states have adjusted to . declining
enrollments ^and, i size- economies by ad justing their state aid
formulas ..to ..meet their ..respective politically (determined goals,
i- CHANGING ,JHE: DEFININTIQN OF DISTRICT WEALTH
\.-.:..r.It should ..be noted that the various school aid formula
options reviewed in -.another companion . .ireport (Edelman . .and
knudsen) result in different consequences related to uniformity
in property- tax -levyrates .and equalization ' of per^ pupil
expenditures.. c ^ ^.^-r ••- • •• _ t>- • .i--
v.'Some- .formulas >-achieyB .'Uniform _ levy- ratesp but*, create
variation^ per .pupilc;eKpenditur.es across districts. . > Other
formulas vachieve .equalized per. pupil .expenditures, by, creating
variation in-property tax levy.rates across.^districts. : Finallyp
still- other formulas achieve uniform tax rates and equalized
expenditures per pupil.- 1% i - . ..
I This is an.important .considerationy as.Iowa, and many -other
states contemplate <altering? the.-; legal:-•: definition of', district
wealth.:.ThB. Ttraditionaldefinition of. ^.district, wealth for
defining- .local,.;effort is, property wealth per pupil. State -.aid
formulas that.?use property.'twealth per pupil to -define district
wealth also define-potential, local effort as property tax yield.
These , ..school aidsystemsn hayej tended ,tp - foster uniform, local
property, tax ^.efforts - across .districts. Howeveri as. . local
officials receive local discretion to levy local sales and income
tax rsvenuasy perhaps there : is a, basis for broadening-.the
definition of district wealth-for'defining local effort.
On the other hand, a Nebraska study advocates adding
district income and sales to the definition of district wealth
for purposes of setting local property tax-rates (Hudson).' While
this approach may, initially appear to be more reflective of total
community wealth, the specific proposal ignores.the contribution
of locally paid sales and income taxes collected by- state
government and contributed to school aid. • Therefore,' ' this
approach may introduce double-counting distortions that would
reduce the uniformity of property tax rates across- districts
unless.other adjustments are made. . .
For example, assume that we^analyze two.districts with equal
total-wealth, but one is property?rich and^ income poor-while the
other is income rich and property poor. Futher assume that the
property rich district has twice as much property wealth per
pupil' as the property poor district and the income rich district
Has twice as much income wealth per pupil as the income- poor
district. Mhat are the school aid consequences?
Under .the Hudson Plan for Nebraska, both districts would
recieve the same, amount ;of state aid. Howeverthe. income rich
district, would - pay more.than twice the income taxes per pupil
(assuming graduated tax rates) to the state and in turn-to state
school aid funding. At the same :time the income- rich district- is
property poor, therefore it must, still raise the difference
between state aid and local cost. With' half'as <much property
wealth -per pupil as in the property rich district, the tax rate
-in the property poor -district would be twice as high in dollars
per thousand of taxable valuation.
If the above approach were applied in Iowa, the double
counting distortions would likely be greater'because the state
share contributes two—thirds of educational -costs in Iowa
compared to only one-third in Nebraska. In short, it is not
internally consistent to count local sales and income in
measuring community wealth for setting property taxes, without
including., local, sales and income<contributions to the state
school aid formula^
There are three options for eliminating the double-^counting
problem:
Keep the present system. The present Iowa state aid
formula does, not count income or sales in district wealth or
district effort. Therefore, it is internally consistent and tends
to encourage uniform property tax rates across districts.
However, the present system does allow per pupil expenditures to
vary accorrding to district wealth and/or an aging set Of relative
budget limits.
^2) Count local effort as well as district wealth', • The
second option is to • count' the local sales' and • income tax
contribution that -.is^made to state school aid as part ^ of the
local district revenue effort, if sales and income wealth is to
be counted in district wealth.. This would provide an internally
consistent measure, of. community wealth and community revenue
effort toward education finance.
(3). Wove to a state funded svstem and state orooertv tax.
The third option'~is to move to. a totally state, funded system with
all school property taxes collected by..the state. This approach
also would result in the counting sales and income in both
district wealth and district revenue effort.
In sufflmaryy using income and sales to define district wealth
without adding it to the district revenue effort would change the
poor districts under the current formula to rich diatricts and
the current rich districts to poor districts (Hudson). At the
same timoy it would significantly increase the variation in
property tax rates across school districts. However^ the
methodology of this option is not internally consistent due to
double counting.
On the other hand, adding income and sales to both district
wealth and district revenue effort would provide a more
consistent measure of community wealth and effort. This option
would likely have significantly less impact on the current
distribution of school aidy but would be internally consistent.
Alternatively^ if property taxes were to be collected by the
state, variation in the contribution of property, sales and
income tax contributions could be reduced, while equalizing per
pupil expenditures across districts.
Finally, some of the alternative definitions of "district
wealth" may significantly alter the amount of state aid for
districts with declining enrollment and/or economies of size.
However, the accuracy of the formula in addressing any
politically defined needs depends upon consistent definitions for
local wealth and local revenue effort.
f ADDRESSING DECLINING ENROLLMENT:.. . - v
PHANTOM PUPILS
.• . ' • ' •. - •
Pravioua resaarch has shown that doclining enrollments lead
to rising costs per pupil, particularly in the short run. Iowa is
t' ' J '-TOT }"•„ '<K-'' •,' ' • ' • , ..
among S7 stated that recognize this by adjusting their school aid
formula to provide added aid to schools with declining
enrollments (School Finance at a Glance).
In many of these states, the state government allows a
school with declining enrollment to count a previously higher
5 t'v r> . r.; ' i ! - i J.' ."'j',. ;•
number of pupils for funding purposes than they actually have
during the current year. The difference between the actual
number of pupils and the number used for funding purposes is
' '• s " I :*• .j' I- i. ".A ' I
referred to as phantom pupils.
Cavin, Murnane and Brown found that the cost increases were
more acute in the short run than the long run. They advocate the
state aid formula should provide for the immediate hardship
placed on schools when enrollments declined but at the same time
it should provide an incentive for the district to adjust to the
decline in the long run.
Another study (Leppert and Routh) outlines four additional
ways that states have used to alleviate the effects of enrollment
decline. Each approach provides a slightly different time period
of added support, different amount of support, and different
• i" • j'.'.' i j . ' / •Li." ^ ^ . I • •
phase-in of incentives for adjusting to declining enrollment.
• 1- •. • f.;. ' ^ I • " . '
The options are:
(1) Initial support and phase out. An example of such a
plan would allow school districts to count all of the decline in
pupils from last year, 66 percent of the decline in pupils from
two years ago and.33-percent of-the declina-in pupils from three
years ago fpr determination of ai'di ^
(S) State aid Guarantee. . Each school district receives no
less in basic aid than they' received in^-^some previous year.
Three states use this option.' •
(3) Prior year pupi 1 count.: Each district is allowe^d to
.use- a .previous years' pupil count .for' the: ^current . year. Nine
statss use ^ this option."
(^) •• Multi-vear average.. - .Each district uses the average; of
the previous-, two or three years' pupil count to determine the
currant year's aid level. Three states use this option. •
.<5). Lost student percentage guarantee. All or less than
100 percent of the enrollment decline can be used in the current
year's aid distribution.' Eight s.tates- use' this> option. • > v
• Two additional states allow either-'option number ( ii)'- or
<iii>. One state does not^provide state; aidp' but' allows the
local board to raise an additional property tax levy rate. ~
ADDRESSING ECONOniES OF SIZE;
CLASSROGM UNITS
Previous research has shown <Edelmahr : and Knudseri) that
economies of scale are likely to exist among the nation's school
districts ' (Edelmah' and Knudsen)'. A summary of ' the - literature
indicates'that most economies may be achieved by school districts
with 700 to EOOO pupils. In Iowa both large and small - school
districts show higher expenditures per pupil. - . .
A review of state programs indicates that some states are
divided as to whether additional support should be granted to
districts not achieving economies of size or whether incentives
for achieving « economies of^ size, should -be-given (Cohn> - - -Some
states provide both . Here we explore ..each in turn. -
^ Some .statesi' :par.t.icular;ly .-those with sparse population and
where -consolidation is not - geographically : feasible, :recognize
that ; small rural schools genBrallyNhave higher .costs per pupil
and .>they> may not be ;abie: to achieve a larger size. Some .of these
states-.':<Nebraskay South Dakota)^ adjust their school aid formula
to provide more-aid to -districts with lowen pupil/teacher ratios
or. sparsity -:of.2-population.-. (:This .'may< <be done by >substituting
classroom-unitsy sparsity weights, or- other administrative units
in the aid formula in .place of the pup.il. count... ^ -
. .vA- .classroom unit<mayibe-definedrasiths number of pupils
divided by., the 'pupil-/teacher ratio.7. This .. type, formula base
focuses^on supporting .teaching"fulIr-.time-equiyalents, .regardless
of' the number of students per PTE. As a result, each student is
guaranteed^: .access to* ^a minimum-number of teachers^regardless of
school -size or' district':sparsity. . " - 1 . - •/-r - r
An extension of the classroom unit approach is to categorize
all expenditures into : functions-, and to develop state aid
standards for each.', functional unit. ~ For: example, ^ a, school
district might' .haye, three ^administrative .. units, 41, classroom
units,^ and10 special education'Units, r The. aid for the whole
district, would be :the.sum of the aid standards for each function
times- the:. PTEs standards for each function and-size of school.
The PTE standards may.be graduated by size.or proportional. .
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RESTRUCTURING INCENTIVES -TO ACHIEVE
ECONOMIES OF SIZE
If achieving economies of size is deem to be a worthy goal,
there are five basic types of restructuring options available:
•<1) . Vpluntary Restructuring Incentives. Iowa currently is
among the' states that use voluntary restructuring incentives to
encourage districts to achieve economies of scale. This approach
focuses on rewarding consolidation up to a specified level and/or
penalizing or raising the relative costs of the status quo. This
may be . done by regulations and standards.as well as financial
rewards, and penalties in .the.aid formula.-
Increased teacher certification requirements, minimum pay
standards^ .minimum. course • offerings, school . district
certification and-mandatory program-spending requirements are all
examples of Iowa regulations that penalize or .increase the
relative costs .of districts that choose to maintain the status
quo.-.Some other states simply require a minimum number of pupils
in the.school unit, or state aid is withdrawn. This creates - an
interesting type of competition for-students in order to keep the
district.above the-minimum. However, the point is that all of the
above tools are outside of the school aid formula. •
On the -other hand,.Iowa also offers • technical .assistance
free .to school districts that request help in conducting
feasibility studies on their restructuring options. This is an
important positive i'ncentive, because restructuring issues may
occur every few decades. There often is' not local expertise
available and myths and emotions can often drive public decisions
in the abscence of factual information on the options.-
•' Another voluntary restructuring approach is to 'provide
incentives fin the state school aid formula. Required local levy
rate reductions for consolidation;'' added weighting for' whole
grade?sharing^ instructor^sharihg and superintendent sharing; and
%
guaranteed ceilings on future .costs per'pupil"-are all'ways' that
riowa' . : uses' ; to*" provide^ • school ^aid' *incentives *for- achieving
economies'.of'/size:;' • - r
)sWhile . .;r ivoluntary • restructuring v may -' appeal ' "^to an
entrepreneurial spirit^- it likely^results ih^ sub-standard access
to ., educational^resources-for those pupils who.are in districts
which. are>nbt- achievingAscale economies -and which choose-not > to
restructuref: particularly-'^if-ythe^district's'budget 'l^imits- are
holding . perpupil spending down. ^Therefore, -eome*'''studehte may
have unequal:access-to education finance.resourcesvae a result of
state and Iocal:policy decisions.^' r . i > -
• <..r - In^^ addition^.-! the .voluntary restructuring option ^^does'^ not
necessarily'ir'>resul,t -in..economiesvof scale :for districts^ that are
restructured. The voluntary, approach often results in "orphan
districts" and-"perverse alMances^" unless the -state has veto
authority over local voluntary restructuring plans and uses the
authority to safeguard state interests'.
"Orphan .districts" :are small school districts that become
geographically isolated by voluntary ' restructuring when all
neighboring districts rmerge- with other districts. ."Perverse
alliances" . may occur when .two- school districts that are
geographically dispersed with very few miles of adjoining
boundary decide to merge in order to maintain the-status quo - in
attendance centers.
10
(2) Mandatory Restructuring• Mandatory restructuring
achieves scale economies - and does not necessarily ^require
additional state aid nor does it result in the orphan districts
or :perverse alliances. A revieM of the literature of the .late
1950s and early 196OS9. however^ suggests that.this option is only
implemented with high political costs during the next election.
(3) Mandatory Study and Local Vote. This approach- is an
alternate model that was implemented during the 1950s and l?60s
(Indiana). This approach requires the.county (or area) judge to
appointment a county (or area-wide) study committee- that studies
the structuring options, including the status, quo.; Their
recommended plan must.be approved by a state board that assures
that orphan districts and perverse alliances do not develop;. The
approved, recommendation—including, the-.status quo if it is
recommended—;must ..then be approved county., or area*-w.ide by
specified voting rules in which no one district has veto, power
unless it has a specified proportion of the combined pupil count;
(^) Open EnrolIment and Tuition Grants. In recent years, a
number of states have debated the concept of allowing parents and
children to choose the school that they wish to attend. To be
effective, this .approach must alter_the state . aid formula by
coupling the state' aid to each pupil: rather than the .district and
then allowing the pupils and parents.to decide where they wish to
attend school (Minnesota). This option establishes a type of
market competition among school districts to attract and maintain
student counts.
"Survival of the fittest" takes place among school
11
districts. Small and large schools may both- survive if they
possess s^-a perceived:'higher ''quality of education" and/or if the
economics- of ^attending alternative'^schools are not prohibitive
for-pairente; This option-does give parents ^more . relative^* control
T
over school'-decisibns-in'cases'where they may be out-voted by
general-taxpayer'interests.''This is not''an insignificant shift'of
power in many districts..-.:. Many rural' districts currently possess
voting^ majorities by "citizens Without school age children^. ^ .-The
voting, stranth of parents is likely to .decline due to an.- aging
pbpulatibny particularly.in rural areas.
< In-additionp perhaps-the open enrolIment concept.would also
require safeguards-to-prevent'segregation by wealthy.race, and/or
other adverse-'factors ^that ^may occur in .market-systems. -
... - '•Finally^'- -this -option does not necessarily achieve
economies • of size. ' If the - perceived quality 'jof^- education
received-is not correlated-with scale-economies^ then parents may
select the'largest or-the smallest, districts depending upon;their
preferences. . - <i. . - -
<5> Communication Technology. A final option is the adoption
of new communication technologies >.that may alter the economies of
size. For example, fiber optics is presently being tested by a
few Ibwa school systems^ This technology allows an instructor at
one site to teach students at a number of remote sites. It
requires the presence of a teaching assistant at each remote
site. This technology may provide students with access to a
wider range of course offerings or provide access to . specialized
subjects at a.lower cost. It remains to be seen whether fiber
12
optics will^ be used ^for a-wide -variety- of courses-, or for
.specialized, courses only. It is^also unclear^.at the time of
this revieNy whether these new technologies will significantly
alter the present.economies of size that exist in Iowa schools.
^Howevery if a major contribution to altering the economies
of size is made by the. emerging technologies, state policymakers
may wish to provide state.-.aid incentives for local district
innovations. .Care' must-be taken in designing such grants, so
that they do.not penalize the first adopters on.the cutting .edge
who., previously financed . their ..program development from own
sources. .Similar^ to the implementation .of state . building
programs^ perhaps slow districts are rewarded at the expense of
the districts who previously build. schools at their, own expense.
SCHOOL SPENDINI3 LIMITATION OPTIONS
... UNDER DECLINING ENROLLMENT
^>One final consideration is the effects of school, spending
limitations on districts which face declining .enrollments and
diseconomies of size. There are three basic types., of school
specific spending limitations'. Each is reviewed in turn.
(1)' Budget Limits. This option limits the school district
spending to some previous year base plus allowable growth. .. Iowa
uses this approach.. Ab> enrollments decline and diseconomies, of
size develop, more school districts are likely to be affected by
the budget limits. As this occurs, local district expenditures
per pupil become a function of previous board decisions made
during the base year selected. As the base year selected becomes
more out-'of—date, the relative budget limitations across
districts become more antiquated as well.
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As .a result, arbitrary selection of a base year for purposes
of implementing district budget 1 imitations,: does not.>. assure
uniform property taxation or • school expenditure equalization
across, districts, if the limitatione-are binding., -The. budget
limit only-preserves the relative variations in expenditures per
pupil across.districts for' a.previous base year.-
(S) Levy . Rate Limits- . This approach assures property
taxpayers that their property tax rate* will not : exceed a
specified level.' However, if.the local leeway is not equalized
with state aid, expenditures per pupil at the; limit- will not
necessarily be uniform across districts and will.Tikely vary by
district wealth. Under declining enrollment, valuation per pupil
rises and may. likely lead to rising expenditures per pupil,
depending upon the formula used.
(3) Limits on Expenditures Per Pupi1. This option assures
that each pupil potentially- has access a ..uniform .amount of
education finance resources per pupil, regardless of the.district
wealth available. Under declining enrollment, the.~ per .pupil
limitation does not change. Consequently, .j.this may cause
economic hardship for districts that would normally face rising
expenditures per pupil due to . declining enrollment, unless
adjustments, such as phantom pupils, were allowed.
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